



MASTER OF SCIENCE IN 

























SEPTEMBER - 2014  




MASTER OF SCIENCE IN 
 




















PROF. CLARA RAPOSO 









Main Drivers of Bank Default Situations 
Francisco S. Paiva 
Supervisors: Clara Raposo, João Bastos 





Since the 2007’s financial crisis we have witnessed an unprecedented number of 
financial institutions that either failed or had to be bailed out by the public sector. 
This work studies distress situations in financial institutions in the Euro area between 
2001 and 2012, based on a data set with listed banks. The database is used to 
understand the main drivers for bank defaults, either financial (bank-specific) 
indicators, but also macroeconomic indicators are considered in the performed 
estimations. The main results show that both bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables impact on default events. Capitalization, asset quality, market discipline, 
GDP growth rates and inflation rates are the most significant on the estimation results 
and should be taken into consideration when analyzing bank distress situations. 
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Since the 2007’s financial crisis we have witnessed an unprecedented number 
of financial institutions that either failed or had to be bailed out by the public sector. 
These bail out programs conducted by State-owned institutions were intended not 
only to avoid systemic risk, i.e. the risk of collapse of an entire financial system, but 
also to attempt to mitigate the negative effects of these bank failures in the real 
economy. Global banking crises, such as the 1890-91, 1907-08, 1913-14, 1931-32 and 
the one we have been witnessing (Bordo & Landon-Lane, 2010), have huge impact on 
economies leading to deep worldwide economic recession. Despite supervisory 
authorities around the world provided ample bailout programs to fragile banks, 
deposit guarantees to the general customer (to avoid bank runs) and highly 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, the world wide recession was inevitable, 
as a result of the credit crunch and the breakdown of the interbank market (Bordo & 
Landon-Lane, 2010). In Europe and particularly in the euro area, the lower economic 
performance could have affected the solvency of financial institutions, through big 
financial losses and lack of capacity from banks to absorb these external shocks.  
Several bank failures occurred in Europe since 2008 with huge costs for 
taxpayers. Between 2008 and 2012, the overall volume of aid used for capital support 
(recapitalization and asset relief measures) amounted to €591.9 billion (4.6 % of EU 
2012 GDP)1. Understanding the factors behind these failures is essential to empower 
supervisory authorities with the ability to prevent default situations in a more efficient 
way. The ability to predict failures or at least understand them would be a tremendous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Source: (DG Competition - European Commission, 2013) 




gain in financial supervision and also to society in general, by avoiding the high bail 
out costs such as the ones we are witnessing nowadays.  
This work studies the distress situations in financial institutions in the Euro 
area between 2001 and 2012, based on a data set with listed banks (in stock exchange 
indexes) from the euro area. The database is used to understand the main drivers for 
bank defaults, either financial (bank specific) indicators, or macroeconomic 
environment indicators.  
Most of the existing literature focuses on the USA financial market and 
emerging markets (Kocagil, Reyngold, Stein, & Ibarra, 2002; Thomson, 1991). 
However, there is less literature on EU banks and even less in Euro area banks, since 
there did not exist many relevant bank distress situations until the recent crisis.  
This work intends to provide a deep analysis on the comprehension of bank 
default situations across the Euro area in this recent financial and sovereign crisis. 
Contributing to a deep unprecedented insight of the recent Euro area’s banking crisis, 
of which there are few approaches.  
Once the default situations are identified on the database, which exclusively 
occurred in the recent financial crisis, between 2008 and 2012, a panel data probit 
model is used in order to identify the main drivers of bank default situations. Using 
both bank specific and macroeconomic variables as possible distress variables. Bank 
specific indicators seem to be highly significant in determining distress situations 
during this financial turmoil. However, macroeconomic variables can also play a very 
relevant role on this quest, since banks are highly connected with the real economy’s 
performance (Thomson, 1991; Poghosyan & Cihak, 2011; Porath, 2006). The used 
methodology also wants to approach both impacts (bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables) on bank default situations and also in bank’s performance, since there is no 




consensus on whether macroeconomic variables impact on bank default situations. 
The approach confirms the relevance of both financial and macroeconomic variables 
on bank distress situations. Therefore, similar approach should be taken into 
consideration by the European authorities when analyzing bank default situations.  
The structure of this work comprises a revision of the existing literature 
(section 2) on similar bank failure prudential models. Followed by section 3, where 
methodology and data are discussed, along with a description of how database was 
built and its main assumptions regarding distress situations. Section 5, shows the main 
results on the estimations and its discussion. Section 6 concludes, giving possible 
solutions to certain raised issues.       
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite the recent financial crisis around the world, studies related to 
prudential models on banking distress situations have been published well before the 
2008 financial turmoil.  
In 1974 Robert Merton proposed a model to evaluate the credit risk of a 
corporation’s debt by characterizing the corporate’s equity as a call option on its 
assets (Merton, 1974).  Several extensions of this model in order to assess credit risk 
of companies have been developed (Black & Cox, 1976; Geske, 1977; Ahangarani, 
2007). Despite the recognition of these structural models on corporate credit risk 
assessment, this approach may suffer from some limitations inherent in pricing 
methods when applied to financial institutions, since it ignores liquidity risk or 
transaction costs (Antunes & Silva, 2010).     




Statistical prediction models were also developed before the recent financial 
crisis. Thomson (1991) studies bank failures in the 1980s with book data on US banks 
using a logit regression model. Through bank specific and macroeconomic variables, 
Thomson (1991) explains failure of the analyzed banks, where financial specific 
variables and economic conditions appear to affect the probability of bank failure. 
Most studies related with prediction of bank failures refer to U.S. banks, such as 
Moody’s RiskCalc™ Model for Privately-Held U.S. Banks, (Kocagil, Reyngold, 
Stein, & Ibarra, 2002), which covers the U.S. market from 1986-1999 including 
17,673 banks and uses a probit estimation model.  
The risk factors used to predict bank failure are related to different scopes of 
banking risk - capital, asset quality, concentration (on asset type), liquidity, 
profitability, growth and macro factors (Moody’s Trailing Speculative Default Rate 
Index). To measure capital adequacy it is used the Equity capital / Assets ratio, which 
is expected to have a negative impact (i.e. higher capital ratio means lower probability 
of default). For asset quality, the variables considered were Charge-Offs / Assets 
installments and Charge-Offs / Assets, their impact is expected to be positive, which 
means higher ratios leads to higher probabilities of default. The variables measuring 
concentration were Commercial Real Estate Loans / Assets, Construction Loans / 
Assets and C&I Loans / Assets, these are expected to have a positive impact in terms 
of probabilities of default, since higher ratios would mean lower diversification and 
higher exposure to a single sector. Liquidity (risk), which refers to the possibility of 
difficulties in meeting cash demands from current assets, is measured through 
Government Securities / Assets; its impact is expected to be negative, as a higher ratio 
would mean a higher percentage of liquid assets, meaning lower liquidity risk. 
Profitability is measured through Net Interest Income / Assets and is expected to have 




a negative impact on probabilities of default. The growth variable (liabilities growth) 
is expected to have a positive impact on probabilities of default, because higher 
growth rate could suggest unsustainability of their management structure, and could 
mean the institution is measuring risk in an ineffective way. The macroeconomic 
variable reflects information on changes in credit quality in the financial markets, 
which is captured by Moody’s Trailing Speculative Default Rate Index; the impact is 
expected to be positive on probabilities of default of a bank.  The final result is a 
model that the authors believe to be well suited to forecast future defaults. It could be 
viewed as a good aggregator of financial specific data that allows comparison 
between banking risks (Kocagil, Reyngold, Stein, & Ibarra, 2002).  
However, we have observed an increasing number of related studies within the 
European financial institutions. Starting with German savings banks and cooperative 
banks, Porath (2006), covering for a period from 1993 to 2002, where a panel data 
binary model (logit, probit and log-logistic) is used, combining financial specific data 
and macroeconomic data. The studied (bank specific) variables follow a criterion 
similar to Kocagil, Reyngold, Stein, & Ibarra, (2002). As such, we could group the 
bank specific indicators into categories, the so called CAMEL variables, which stands 
for Capital (represented by Equity/Assets), Asset quality (Non-performing loans/total 
loans or loans loss provisions / total loans), Management (Cost-to-income ratio), 
Earnings (Operating results/ equity or EBIT/equity capital) and Liquidity (which was 
omitted from further analysis by the author due to lack of adequacy of the data). In 
terms of macroeconomic variables, Porath (2006) uses indicators for business cycles 
(such as GDP growth rate, money supply and unemployment) and macroeconomic 
prices (Interest rates and stock prices).  The behavior of the chosen variables is similar 
to the previous mentioned study. The bank specific variables are similar, and so the 




expected behavior is also identical.  For macroeconomic variables the authors chose 
different variables, such as GDP growth rate, which is expected to have a negative 
impact on probabilities of default. On the other hand, interest rates, another 
macroeconomic environment chosen variable, are expected to have a positive impact 
on default probabilities, since higher interest rates can be interpreted as higher risk 
perception from investors. The expected behavior for stock prices is the opposite from 
that of the interest rates, with the same rationale. The results from this estimation 
demonstrate that general macroeconomic environment, bank’s return, asset quality 
variables and capitalization measures are significant determining the banks’ 
probabilities of default. The author also concludes that capitalization measures are the 
most relevant for the probabilities of default estimation, and that saving banks and 
cooperative banks are affected by the same risk factors (Porath, 2006).  
Another example of a related study covering European banks is Poghosyan & 
Cihak (2011), which covers the period just before the recent financial crisis (1996 to 
2007). The data used in the estimation of the probabilities of default (PDs) of 
individual banks is an extensive panel data for 5,708 European Union banks, 
estimated through a logistic probability binary model. The models in this study use 
not only bank specific CAMEL indicators, with indicators similar to those found in 
previous studies, but other potential determinants of banking risk, such as measures 
for market discipline (measured by the ratio of total interest expenses to total 
deposits) and measures to capture the clustering of bank failures (through a “dummy” 
contagion variable), where is captured to some extend the macroeconomic 
environment of the bank. The bank specific variables used in the performed model are 
similar to those used in the previous studies, and their behavior should be identical. 
The capitalization is measured as the ratio of total equity to total assets, lower ratio 




would mean higher leverage, making the bank less resilient to certain shocks (sudden 
decrease in value of assets). Assets quality is measured through the ratio loan loss 
provisions to total loans (identical to those used the previous analyzed studies, and so 
similar behavior is expected). As a management quality parameter, the authors 
applied the cost-to-income ratio, which is the one used in the previous study, and a 
higher ratio would imply a weaker performance. To measure bank earnings the 
authors chose both ROE (Return on Equity ratio) and ROA (the Return on Assets 
ratio), which should impact negatively on the probabilitites of a bank default, 
suggesting that a higher return would mean lower distress probabilities. Liquidity, 
which is measured through the liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding, is 
expected to have a positive impact on the probabilities of a bank default, a lower ratio 
would imply a higher exposure to liquidity risk. The market discipline variable is 
expected to have a negative impact on the probabilities of a bank default in the sense 
that higher market discipline would suggest lower probabilities of distress, i.e. lower 
interest expenses to total deposits ratio. In the end, the model performance is 
satisfactory in classifying distressed banks, with capitalization, asset quality and 
earnings measures to be considered as statistically significant, as well as the measure 
for market discipline and the contagion variable.  
In Poghosyan & Cihak, 2011 the market information (measured, for instance, 
by stock prices) appears to be relevant for predicting distressed situations. Market 
information is deeply explored in studies such as Curry, et al., 2003, suggesting that it 
contains relevant information on predicting distressed situations in financial 
instituions. Curry, et al. (2003) stated that publicly available information such as stock 
prices, returns and other market-related variables can provide timely information 
about the soundness of a financial institution. The authors also suggest that specially 




equity market variables such as stock prices, returns, price volatility, market 
valuation, trading volume and share turnover improve the fit of the prediction model 
combined with traditional accounting data, as CAMEL indicators (Curry, Elmer, & 
Fissel, 2003). 
The early developed models address the bank default risk in different ways, as 
it was previously mentioned. There is no consensus on the variables to be considered 
in the estimation models, and there are few studies performed with Euro area financial 
institutions. In this framework, the developed estimation models comprise Euro area 
banks, capturing the impact of both bank specific and macroeconomic variables. The 
recent financial crisis, namely in Europe and more specifically in the Euro area, raised 
important issues on supervision of banks. The soundness of financial system and the 
comprehension of how default situations trigger, are a great motivation to this work.    
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To evaluate the main drivers of a bank default event an econometric probit 
model using panel data is estimated. The panel data set allows the combination of 
bank specific with macroeconomic variables. The explained variable in the model will 
be the default of a bank, which is represented by a binary variable assuming the value 
0 if the bank did not incur in default on the analyzed year, and the value 1 if the bank 
incurred in default on the analyzed year. To assign 0 or 1 to the default variable we 
need to define clearly the default event, i.e. under what conditions the bank is 
considered to default. We should take into consideration the fact that most banks do 
not completely bankrupt, due to state intervention programs (through capital 
injections or state guarantees and other forms of liquidity support) developed to avoid 




systemic risk and to restore confidence in the financial sector, crucial to economic 
development. Thus, default is defined as any state or supervisory authorities’ 
intervention directly on capital, any kind of state guaranteed funding or asset purchase 
programs conducted by State owned institutions. The criteria behind this rationale 
results from the fact that a bank on these situations might not be able to meet 
international capital requirements by its own means or would not be able to fund its 
activities with market sources or, even worst, both situations. Another explanation for 
State intervention in banks may well result from stimulus creation to avoid credit 
crunch in the real economy.  
This binary default variable will be the explained variable in the estimation 
probit model, through a set of different bank specific and macroeconomic variables.  
Let 𝑌!" be defined as the default variable of year t and from the specific bank j, 
and let 𝑋!" be the set of bank specific variables of the year t and the individual bank j. 
Let 𝑍!" represent the set of macroeconomic variables for the year t and the specific 
bank j. Considering these, we should have a panel binary response model given by: 
 
(1)  𝑆!,! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋!,!,! + 𝛽!!!𝑍!!!,!,! +   𝜀!,!!!!!!!!!  
 
  Where, 𝑆!" is the score that is given to bank j in year t according to its set of 
bank-specific (𝑋!") and macroeconomic (𝑍!") variables.  Regarding the bank specific 
variables the estimations will measure for the so-called CAMEL indicators 
(Capitalization, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earnings and Liquidity) and 
other financial related variables (market discipline and growth), while 
macroeconomic variables will account for economic business cycles and for 




macroeconomic prices. This estimation will use a probit random effects regression, 
which allows for individual effects. The signs of the 𝛽! and 𝛽!!!, coefficients give us 
the direction of the impact considering a marginal change in the explanatory variables 
on the probability of default. 𝛽! is the constant coefficient that together with the link 
function described below, 𝜙(𝛽!), gives the probability of default when the other 
explanatory variables are set to zero. 
 The probit implies a link function given by: 
 









The probit link function (2) will give us the probability of default considering 
a specific 𝑆!", which characterizes a given financial institution in a specific moment in 
time (year).    
 
3.1. Data Description 
The data set used to assess the main drivers on bank default is based on banks 
headquartered in the founding countries of euro area, covering from 2001 to 2012 
(annual data). Due to complexity and bias of applying annual exchange rates to 
financial data, the database was restricted to banks headquartered in the founding 
countries of the euro area. Furthermore, the data set was restricted to stock exchange 
listed banks, as such the IBEX 35 (Spain), the PSI-20 (Portugal), CAC 40 (France), 
FTSE MIB (Italy), DAX-30 (Germany), ASE (Greece), BEL 20 (Belgium), AEX 
(Netherlands), ISEQ 20 (Ireland), ATX (Austria) and OMXH25 (Finland) were the 
considered indexes. The Luxembourg stock market index (the LuxX) was also 




considered, however there is no listed bank besides the KBC Group, which has 
already been considered in the BEL 20 index. The fact that the euro area is a recently 
created monetary union, with a recent unprecedented financial crisis, makes the 
assessment of the drivers of bank defaults an interesting and relevant analysis, 
especially in the field of banking supervision.     
The source of the financial individual data is the published annual reports of 
each financial institution. This selection criterion brought some problems on specific 
institutions, namely Unicredit whose the available financial information does not 
cover the whole period of the sample, and Media Banca, another Italian bank, wherein 
the financial information available is differently organized (financial year ends in July 
of each year) which could bias and  lead to miscalculation problems in the sample. 
Thus, these two institutions were not considered in the sample.  
Given this framework, the set of banks that were considered in the database 
are presented in table III of Appendix section. The sample contains 31 banks from 
2001-2012, leading us to 372 observations.  
  




3.1.1. Defaults’ characterization 
The default characterization is one of the key issues of this analysis. The 
default selection criteria, mentioned above on the methodology section, brought 
several identified default situations. Figures 1, 2 and 3 of Appendix section show that 
most of bank failures resulted from the turbulent financial environment that began in 
2008, affecting almost every European economy.  
Every observed default (39 defaults) occurred between 2008 and 2012 and 
almost 50% of those defaults occurred in 2009, the year following the Lehman 
Brothers (US bank) bankruptcy. As shown in figure 1 (of Appendix section), no 
defaults were observed in Spain or in Finland. Despite the several bailout programs in 
Spanish smaller sized banks (Bankia or Caixa Bank), the Spanish analyzed banks in 
the sample registered no state intervention and showed good solvency levels. Their 
diversification strategy through emerging markets, namely Latin America helped 
Spanish banks to keep their good solvency levels.  In Finland, the whole economy has 
shown resilience to the crisis, Nordea AB Bank (the only Finnish analyzed bank in the 
sample) has recorded no losses on its financial results; therefore Nordea AB Bank did 
not need a bailout program.   
Most of the observed bank failures occur with State intervention through a 
direct capital injection or through convertible bonds (which are eligible to Core Tier I 
capital, therefore helping Core Tier 1 (CT 1) ratio to meet international requirements). 
Other forms of bailout were adopted, namely state guaranteed funding or absorption 
by state owned organizations of portion of the (toxic) assets owned by banks, in order 
to reduce risk weighted assets (RWAs) and therefore improving the CT 1 ratio and 




solvency levels. Hence, a small insight on bailout intervention programs is given in 
order to understand the events that occurred throughout the sample. 
In Portugal, the main source of financial state intervention occurred in 2012 
through hybrid instruments (CoCo’s – Contingent Convertibles, a security similar to a 
convertible bond, that converts into capital in case the issuer is not able to repay the 
debt; this instrument is accountable to Core Tier I capital) and the total help 
accounted approximately to €4.5B (taking into account the analyzed banks). The state 
intervention that occurred in France was a precautionary program, to avoid credit 
crunch. The three analyzed banks (BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole and Societé 
Générale) incurred in a state aid program that consisted on around €11B of 
subordinated hybrid government bonds. In Italy, the state intervention on banks 
occurred mainly in 2009 through convertible bonds (called the “Tremonti Bonds”). 
The German state intervention program affected one (Commerzbank) of the two 
analyzed banks (Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank), which incurred on a silent 
participation by the Special Fund for Financial Market Stabilization. One of the most 
critical analyzed markets was the Greek one, in which all the analyzed banks were 
intervened through direct capital injections (preference shares) and through 
convertible bonds. Greek banks and Greek economy were extremely affected not only 
by the international economic environment and banks performance during the sample 
period, but mostly due to Greek sovereign debt default (2012), which increased 
substantially banks’ losses through impairments. The banking crisis in Belgium 
affected both analyzed banks (KBC Group and Dexia). However, the intervention 
level on Dexia was much higher with several programs occurring between 2008 and 
2012, consisting not only in capital injections (2008), but also in state funding 
guarantees. In the Netherlands, the ING Group (the only bank considered in the 




sample) was subject to a state capital injection in 2008 due to bank’s bad performance 
and the bank need for capital in the considered year, and in 2009 the Dutch state took 
over the risk of 80% of a large package of US Alt-A mortgage loans, reducing ING’s 
Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs) and therefore improving solvency levels. Another 
financial market which was considered to be deeply connected to the US market was 
the Irish one. Its banks’ performance was highly affected in 2009 (right after the US 
financial turmoil), incurring on deep restructuring programs, which consequently 
affected the Irish State itself. Regarding the Austrian banks, Raiffeisen Bank and 
Erste Bank incurred on state capital injections of almost €3B during 2009, the most 
distressed period in the sample.  
A deeper analysis on the bank default information is presented in the 
Appendix section on table VI.     
Considering this information on bank defaults (39 default events recorded), it 
is now possible to choose the financial and macroeconomic variables in order to build 
a model for predicting bank default probabilities.  
 
3.1.2. Explanatory variables 
The variables chosen as drivers for bank default cover capital (Total equity / 
Total assets), asset quality (loan impairments / Net loans), management quality (cost-
to-income ratio), earnings or profitability (Return on Assets), liquidity (Liquid assets / 
Short-term funding), market discipline (Net interest income / Net income), growth 
(liabilities growth) and the macroeconomic factors which could be sub-divided into 
business cycle variables and macroeconomic prices.  




 In table I it is performed a simple comparison between the variables in a non-
default situation and a default environment situation. Through the analysis of this 
table, one can conclude that the bank-related variables have different behavior on 
Non-default and default situations. The table shows that defaulted banks have lower 
capitalization, lower earnings, and lower liquid assets as percentage of total assets. 
The loan to deposits ratio (LTD ratio) also shows that defaulted banks tend to have 
higher LTD ratio and lower market discipline defined by the net interest income to net 
loans ratio.  It is also shown that defaulted banks have lower asset quality (meaning 
higher loan impairments to net loans ratio), lower cost-to-income ratio, lower growth 
and higher wholesale funding to total liabilities ratio.  The macroeconomic variables 
behavior is the expected one (lower GDP growth rate, lower inflation and lower 
sovereign bonds interest rates on averaged defaulted banks), except the balance of 
payments whose behavior seems to be the opposite one.  
Nevertheless, a t-test is performed on the chosen variables to assess their 
individual significance level, which gives the statistical interpretation of rejecting or 
not the null hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis of the difference between average defaulted 
and non-defaulted variables be equal to zero.  










Non-default Default   
  
Mean Median Mean Median Standard deviation t-student 
Total Equity / Total 
Assets 5,81% 5,76% 4,18% 3,97% 0,024 -4,30*** 
Loan impairments/ 
Net loans 0,43% 0,30% 1,57% 0,65% 0,015 4,79*** 
Cost-to-Income 
ratio 50,36% 58,20% 40,04% 55,21% 0,387 -1,66 
Return On Equity 21,97% 9,51% 20,71% 1,45% 2,783 -0,03 
Return On Assets 0,37% 0,48% -1,57% -0,06% 0,020 -6,05*** 
Liquid Assets / 
Short-term funding 61,36% 47,80% 61,52% 49,84% 0,492 0,02 
Liquid Assets / 
Total Assets 31,94% 29,05% 31,53% 27,83% 0,139 -0,18 
Net Interest Income 
/ Net Loans 3,11% 2,98% 2,63% 2,39% 0,011 -2,78*** 
Loan to Deposits 
ratio 123,22% 100,43% 197,34% 127,53% 2,249 2,06* 
Liabilities growth 10,03% 5,89% -1,55% -2,40% 0,180 -4,02*** 
Asset growth 9,88% 6,06% -1,32% -1,94% 0,177 -3,95*** 
GDP growth 1,49% 1,70% -3,03% -3,10% 0,028 -9,95*** 
Inflation Rate 2,51% 2,30% 0,99% 1,00% 0,011 -8,37*** 
Government bonds 




-7 744 -11 519 -578 -4 118 44 627 1,00 
Notes: *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Through the performed t-test, one can conclude that the difference between 
the average from the defaulted variables and the non-defaulted is significant within 
the following variables, considering a 5% significance level:  
- Total equity / Total assets; 




- Loan impairments / Net loans; 
- Return on Assets; 
- Net interest income / Net loans; 
- Liabilities and Asset growth; 
- GDP growth rate; 
- Inflation rate; 
- Government bonds interest rates; 
Thus, at a significance level of 5%, one can reject the hypothesis of the 
mentioned difference, between defaulted and non-defaulted variables, be insignificant 
(equal to zero), meaning that the observed difference between the sample mean and 
the average of the defaulted variable can be interpreted as the actual difference 
observed in table I. 
In the following subsections the variables are discussed in more detail. 
 
3.1.2.1. Capital 
The variable used as measure of capital was the simple leverage ratio Total 
equity / Total assets. It is a simple unweighted leverage ratio, different from the 
regulatory capital to risk weighted assets ratio (CT1 ratio). The Basel regulatory 
capital framework has been changing across the sample period. Another reason why 
the simple leverage ratio is used to measure capitalization is the lack of coverage for 
the whole sample period and the complexity to compute the regulatory ratio. The 
analysis made in Kocagil, et al. (2002), suggests that total equity over total assets is 
an informative measure for capital. Most literature uses the simple leverage ratio due 
to similar limitations. Table I shows that the ratio is expected to have a negative 




impact on the probabilities of default, which means that a higher ratio would lead us 
to lower probabilities of default, and higher ability to absorb shocks on bank 
performance. 
 In the figure 4 of the appendix section the evolution of the annual average for 
the capital ratio, in the studied sample, is illustrated. A decline is observed in the 
average of total equity to total assets ratio in 2008, the period in which we observed 5 
defaults in our sample (shown in previous figure 2), and in 2009 (the most defaulted 
period) we observed an increase in the average ratio, which can be explained by the 
capitalization programs lead by the governments that occurred in the period (2009). In 
2011 and 2012 we observe another decline in the ratio matching with another default 
period (9 observed defaults in 2012).   
 
3.1.2.2. Asset Quality 
To determine the asset quality of a financial institution, the considered 
indicator was the loan impairments to total net loans ratio. The variable measures loan 
losses as a percentage of total loans. Since the majority of the analyzed banks are 
commercial banks and their core business is loans and advances to clients, the ratio 
loan impairments to total net loans can be seen as a good measure for asset quality.  
The evolution of the variable shows the great increase on the defaulted periods, 
suggesting a positive impact on probabilities of default of a financial institution 
(figure 5 – Appendix section), in which a higher ratio would imply higher 
probabilities of a bank default. 
 





The management quality of a financial institution could be an important driver 
of a bank default. The cost-to-income ratio is used to determine the management 
quality, which can be viewed as a measure of efficiency, since it measures the 
operating costs as percentage of the banking income. A higher ratio would imply 
lower efficiency as such it is reasonable to expect a positive impact on the 
probabilities of default (higher ratio would mean higher probabilities of default). The 
pattern observed in figure 6 (Appendix section) shows that there is an increase in the 
2008’s cost-to-income ratio, followed by a decrease in 2009 and then an increase in 
the average of 2012. The pattern in 2009 could be also explained by the severe 
restructuring programs several banks adopted, to face high losses.  
 
3.1.2.4. Earnings 
The standard variables Return on Equity and Return on Assets (after-tax) are 
used to capture bank earnings. It is expected that a bank with higher returns should be 
more capable of absorbing external shocks, however we should take into 
consideration the fact that those external shocks would majorly affect bank returns. 
Consequently, an affected financial institution would present lower returns and lower 
ratio, these external shocks can express through losses due to operational risk such as 
results of financial operations or impairments (a company's asset that is worth less on 
the market than the value listed on the company's balance sheet). The financial crisis 
was tremendous and some of the analyzed institutions were unable to absorb the 
external shocks and recorded negative equity, which affected the computation of the 
return on equity ratio (figure 7 of Appendix section). Therefore, the chosen variable 




was the return on assets ratio, which proved to be consistent in situations of distress 
such as negative equity, as it is observable in figure 8 (Appendix section). 
 
3.1.2.5. Liquidity 
Liquidity measures the ability of the assets convertibility into cash. Liquid 
assets are those that can be converted into cash quickly if needed to meet financial 
obligations; examples of liquid assets generally include cash, central bank reserves, 
government debt (which is easily converted through secondary markets) or loans ad 
receivables to banks (short-term). To remain viable, a financial institution must have 
enough liquid assets to meet its short-term obligations, such as withdrawals by 
depositors2. In order to measure for liquidity we considered three possible variables, 
the liquid assets to total assets, which measures the percentage of liquid assets in the 
whole financial institution; and the liquid assets to short-term funding, which is 
similar to a liquidity coverage ratio. The objective of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio is 
to promote resilience to liquidity risk in a short-term basis. The official (Basel III) 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio provides information about the stock of liquid assets that 
could be converted into cash in private markets in order to meet the bank needs for a 
30 calendar day stress scenario. The assessed indicator is a simplified version of the 
official liquidity coverage ratio and tries to capture the capacity of converting assets 
into cash in order to meet financial obligations (measured by short-term funding, 
which includes deposits from other credit institutions and deposits from customers). 
Figures 9 and 10 (of Appendix section) show the average evolution of the considered 
variables. The observed trend shows a decrease in the average liquid assets between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 (Federal Reserve, 2014)	  




2008 and 2009 followed by an increase in the upcoming years. In the financial crisis 
(especially in 2008 and 2009) one can observe a liquidity short-fall, which should be 
expected. It is expectable that higher ratios would improve the solvency level of the 
financial institution and therefore decrease the probability of default (negative impact 
on probability of default).  
Since liquidity risk is a very important issue on credit institutions, another 
commonly used variable for assessing a bank’s liquidity that should be tested is the 
loan to deposit ratio (LTD ratio). A higher ratio could mean that the bank might not 
have enough liquidity to face unforeseen fund requirements. Hence, it is expected a 
positive impact on probabilities of default, which means that a higher ratio would 
imply higher probabilities of default. However, if the ratio is too low, the bank may 
not be earning as much as it could be. The European recommendation for this ratio is 
around 120% on loans to deposits ratio. Figure 11 (of Appendix section) shows the 
evolution of the average ratio across the period. 
 
3.1.2.6. Market Discipline 
The search for market share might encourage financial institutions to increase 
deposit rates and decrease loan interest rates jeopardizing solvency levels. However, 
these financial institutions, by increasing deposit rates or decreasing loan interest 
rates, may not be proceeding in a sustainable manner, and so proceeding with lack of 
market discipline (Poghosyan & Cihak, 2011). The variable chosen to measure market 
discipline was the ratio net interest income to net loans, which captures the gap 
between the interest volume, majorly (considering that the analyzed institutions are 
commercial banks) on credit and the interest expense, majorly on deposits, as 




percentage of total loans of the analyzed bank. Capturing discipline both in credit 
(revenues) and in deposits (expenses). Consequently, it is expected that a higher ratio 
would imply lower probabilities of default (a negative impact on probabilities of 
default). The trend of the average ratio is observable in figure 12.  
 
3.1.2.7. Growth 
The growth rate of a financial institution, in general, should suggest that a 
bank with exceptional or excessive growth has experienced problems because its 
management or structure was not able to sustain such unusual growth (Kocagil, 
Reyngold, Stein, & Ibarra, 2002). Therefore, the growth could be a good indicator in 
order to account for the unsustainability of the specific banking business. The variable 
chosen to measure the growth rate of a specific financial institution is the liabilities 
growth rate. In Kocagil, et al. (2002), the variable is compared to other potential 
indicators for measuring growth and it seems to be the most accurate indicator, it 
should be noticeble that the banking business is highly leveraged and so, liabilties 
growth should provide a good insight on this scope. The recent financial crisis 
brought to us a considerable number of bank restruturing programs, which, in most 
cases, resulted in downsizing of their balance sheets. Taking into account these 
factors, it is expected that this indicator should impact positively on the probabilities 
of default, meaning that higher liabilities growth rates should imply higher 
probabilities of a distress situation. However, these undergoing restructuring 
processes can affect the modeling analysis. Figure 13 (of Appendix section) presents 
the average growth rate of liaibilities during the considered period. 
 




3.1.2.8. Macroeconomic environment factors 
The financial crisis we still live on has been a good reminder of how the real 
economy impacts banking performance. The losses incurred on the banking sector in 
the beginning of the financial crisis destabilized the banking sector and triggered a 
vicious cycle. Problems in the financial system can lead to a downturn in the real 
economy, which in turn hits back banking performance (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2010).  Considering the impact of the macroeconomic environment on 
the financial sector is an important issue in prudential modeling; this study also 
provides some insight on this subject. In order to capture the macroeconomic 
environment impact on banking performance two sets of macroeconomic variables 
are considered, one measuring the business cycle impact, the other measuring the 
macroeconomic prices. For the business cycle, the variable chosen was the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, which captures accurately the business cycle, 
reflecting the upward and downward movements of the economic activity. The impact 
on the probabilities of default should be negative, meaning that an increase in the 
GDP growth rate should decrease the probability of default of a credit institution 
(ceteris paribus) – the average behavior of GDP growth rate is presented in figure 14 
(of Appendix section).  
For the macroeconomic prices, there are several indicators that could be 
considered in order to capture different scopes of macroeconomic prices. Inflation is 
an important measure for the price level of goods and services in an economy and 
could influence the bank performance. Considering the historically stable and low 
levels of inflation in the Euro area (the analyzed region) we should take precautions 
on the expectations of its impact on probabilities of default. The behavior of inflation 




rates in the Euro area countries (presented in figure 15 of Appendix section, as the 
year average) shows a low level across the period and in some cases deflation is 
observable. Hence, expectations should take into consideration how deflation 
(decrease in the general price level of goods and services) or disinflation (decrease in 
the rate of inflation) could impact banking performance. Usually, a decline in 
expected inflation will lead to a decline in the nominal interest rate. However, once 
the nominal interest rates are set to close to zero (situation similar to Euro area’s), a 
decline in the expected inflation will cause the real interest rate to rise (since it is not 
possible to decrease the interest rate). This behavior is likely to slow down the 
economic activity through an increase in the cost of capital and discouraging 
borrowing among consumers and enterprises. Another way deflation could impact 
banking activity is through the value of debt. Deflation increases the real value of debt 
while decreasing the value of collateral for loans. The combination of these factors 
could sharply increase the loan losses and affect bank performance3. The figure above 
illustrates the evolution of inflation in Euro area, and it is observable the mentioned 
low levels and a sharp decline in 2009. Therefore, it should be expected that inflation 
rate impacts negatively on probabilities of default, which means that a decrease in 
inflation would increase the probabilities of a bank default. If inflation recorded 
higher average levels, the expected results on the prediction model could be inverted, 
in the sense that in economies with high inflation rates, credit institutions will lend 
less, the financial markets will be smaller, less liquid and facing higher volatilities 
impacting negatively in the long-run the bank performance (Boyd, Levine, Smith, & 
D., 2000).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  (FDIC, 2003)	  




Another tested variable that fits in macroeconomic prices category is the 
sovereign bonds interest rates. This variable can be interpreted as the sovereign risk, 
which could have impact on banks, in the sense that banks own large sovereign bonds 
portfolios. However, the sovereign bonds yields’ impact could be dubious since 
higher yields imply more risk and in some cases (such as Greek sovereign bonds) 
losses due to sovereign default, but in other sense, higher yields means not only 
higher risk but also higher interest earnings and so higher financial margin implying 
better banking performance. Taking this dual effect on banking performance, it is 
difficult to create expectations on sovereign bond interest rates. The sovereign risk 
affects financial institutions in a more systemic way and could have a contagion effect 
on the whole financial system. Figure 16 illustrates the average Euro area sovereign 
bond yields evolution through the considered period.  
Furthermore, another macroeconomic environment variable, the country’s 
balance of payments, was also tested in the prediction model. The rationale behind 
this indicator is that it gives an insight on the level of debt or surplus of the whole 
economy where the bank is based in. If an economy is highly indebted it means that 
financial institutions should fund themselves with foreign funding sources through 
financial markets and less funding from deposits from customers, this fact would 
make the financial institution more vulnerable to money markets, which bears more 
volatility to the funding structure. The fact that households and corporates are highly 
indebted could make them more vulnerable to external shocks (such as unemployment 
situations or slowdowns in business activity). This fact could have tremendous 
repercussions on the banking performance, with great income losses. Hence, it is 
expected that a higher balance of payments indicator (surplus) should impact 
negatively on the probabilities of default, i.e. a higher deficit on balance of payments 




would be associated with a higher probability of default of a bank based in the 
respective country. The average Euro area balance of payments evolution is presented 
in figure 17 (of Appendix section).    
 Figure 17 shows the tremendous adjustment that has been occurred in the Euro 
area countries after the 2008 crisis. This fact can contribute to a more difficult 
analysis in terms of the variable impact on banking performance.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to analyze possible drivers of bank default, several probit regression 
models with random effects were tested, presented in the table below. The default 
indicator is used as dependent variable, which is already explained in the data 
description section (section 3.1). The default variable takes value 1 if the analyzed 
bank incurred in default in a given period (this means that the bank needed financial 
support to keep their activities or financial guarantees – from its respective State - in 
order to fund their activities) or 0 otherwise. The following table presents the most 
relevant estimation results. 
  


















 With lagged 
period 
Total equity / Total 
assets -15,66*** -16,09*** -19,19** -27,43*** 
Loan impairments / 
Net loans 52,16*** 52,64*** 60,13** 17,95** 
Cost to income -0,15 -0,10 0,12 -0,29 
ROA  2,55 2,52 19,74 0,17 
Liquid assets / total 
assets   0,12 1,27 0,63 
LTD ratio -0,15       
NII / Net Loans -26,94*** -24,92** -47,41*** -26,96*** 
Liabilities growth -3,64*** -3,29*** -3,02** 0,05 
GDP Growth rate     -29,79*** -22,76*** 
Inflation rate     -0,33*** 0,41*** 
sovereign bonds 
interest rates     0,01 0,08 
Balance of Payments     -0,00 -0,00 
Constant 0,39 0,07 0,57 0,57 
Number of 
observations 372 372 372 341 
Notes: *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
In the first regression model, the drivers used to explain default were bank-
specific financial indicators only. Following a criterion already mentioned above, first 
the determinants related with Capital, Asset quality, Managerial skills, Earnings, 
Liquidity, Market discipline and Growth are incorporated. Capitalization was 
measured by ratio of total equity over total assets, higher ratio means the institution is 
better prepared to absorb external shocks. The ratio of loan impairments over net 




loans is used to measure asset quality (from Profit & Loss account), where one could 
expect that a higher ratio would imply a higher probability of default.  For managerial 
skills the ratio used was the cost-to-income, which one would expect a higher ratio for 
higher probabilities of default, meaning a higher percentage of costs in terms of total 
income implying less efficient management skills. The return on equity and return on 
assets ratios are used to measure the bank earnings, with higher ratios suggesting 
better earnings and so lower probabilities of default. Liquidity is measured in different 
ways, by liquid assets (given by central bank and other credit institutions claims, cash 
reserves and trading assets) over total assets, through total assets over deposits and 
short-term funding and through the loan to deposits ratio, their rationale was already 
approached in the subsection 3.1.3.5. Liquidity. Market discipline is measured by the 
ratio net interest income over net loans, a lower ratio would mean the institution has a 
more aggressive strategy in order to gain market share, both in credit conceded to 
customers and in deposits from customers but it could imply lower risk perception, 
meaning a higher probability of default. 
Taking into account the first two panel data probit regression models with 
random-effects that consider only bank-specific financial indicators, their results 
suggest that the impact of capital ratio on probabilities of default is significant (at 1% 
significance level) and in line with the expected results namely a higher capital ratio 
would imply a lower probability of default. With the opposite sign, but also 
significant (significance level of 1%), the ratio for asset quality suggests a behavior 
similar to the expected, namely a higher ratio of loan impairments to net loans means 
a higher probability of default. The results on managerial skills, measured by the cost-
to-income ratio, suggest that the variable is not relevant; this may be explained by 
most banks incurred in restructuration programs, which consisted on huge cost 




reductions and even in size reductions (balance sheet size reductions).  The ROA 
(Return on Assets) variable resulted not to be statistically significant. The chosen 
variables for liquidity showed no statistically significant results, the three variables 
liquid assets as percentage of total assets, liquid assets to short-term funding and the 
loan to deposits ratio. Liquidity risk should have two pillars, the idiosyncratic pillar 
which should be captured by the analysis of the quality of their liquidity risk 
management, and the systemic pillar, which impacts on every credit institution of the 
market (such as severe liquidity disruption in the market). Wu & Han (2013) suggest 
that systemic liquidity risk was the major determinant for the recent bank failures 
(2008 and 2009). This could explain the statistical insignificance of the idiosyncratic 
liquidity risk presented in these predictions.     Another statistically significant (with a 
5% significance level) variable in the first two considered estimation outputs was the 
one related with market discipline (Net interest income over net loans) and it is in line 
with the expected results. Suggesting that higher financial margin over loans (lower 
aggressiveness in the market) implies lower probability of default (negative impact on 
probability of default).  The measure for growth (liabilities growth rate across the 
sample period) does not behave as it was expected. Its impact on default probabilities 
is negative, which means that a higher growth rate of liabilities would imply lower 
probabilities of default. This behavior could be described with a similar rationale as of 
the variable referring to managerial skills (cost to income ratio), with big restructuring 
programs taking place in the majority (non defaulted and specially defaulted) of 
banks. However, the behavior presented in the figure 12 (section 3.1.3.7.) indicates 
that there was exceptional growth in the periods prior to the financial crisis (2008), 
suggesting that further analysis on lagged indicator could be useful in the study of this 
variable, however, such analysis was not performed due to database constraints.  




In the third output regression model the selected macroeconomic variables 
(GDP growth, Inflation rate, 10 year government bonds interest rates and the Balance 
of payments) were added to the previous estimations. These macroeconomic variables 
refer to the country in which the financial institution is based on. The results of this 
third estimation model demonstrate that macroeconomic environment is highly 
connected with banking activities, which is in compliance with the expected 
outcomes. The results suggest good significance levels for GDP growth rate and for 
inflation rate, with significance levels below 1%. In terms of GDP growth rate, the 
results imply a negative relation between the GDP growth and the default 
probabilities of banks; a higher GDP growth rate would imply a lower probability of 
default. This is in line with the expected result and with the theory that states that 
business cycles affect banking performance. The other relevant variable was inflation 
rate, impacting on the same direction as the GDP growth rate variable, with higher 
inflation rates implying lower levels of default probability. Deflation or disinflation 
could be caused (more likely) by a sharp decline in credit supply or a contraction in 
the economy. These deflation periods or really low levels of inflation could have 
impacted negatively on the banking industry, by increasing the real value of debt (of 
households and corporates), since the nominal value of the debts remains constant and 
prices decline, while decreasing the value of collateral for loans, impacting negatively 
on banks’ earnings.  Another contribution to the negative impact of inflation in 
banking performance, already approached in section 3.1.3.8, could be through interest 
rates behavior.  A decline in expected inflation will lead to a decrease in the nominal 
interest rate. However, once the nominal interest rates are close to zero (situation 
similar to Euro area’s), a decline in the expected inflation will cause the real interest 
rate to rise (since it is not possible to decrease the interest rate). This behavior is likely 




to slow down the economic activity through an increase in the cost of capital and 
discouraging borrowing among consumers and corporates, affecting banking 
performance. The other macroeconomic considered variables (sovereign bonds 
interest rates and balance of payments) have no sufficient significant level in order to 
be properly interpreted. Regarding the bank related financial variables the results 
suggest similar trends and significance levels (slight increase) comparing with the 
previous regression model.   
Another relevant performed regression model was a lagged (by one period) 
estimation. This regression model exhibits no different trends in the studied variables. 
The only significant change was in liabilities growth rate variable, which loses its 
significance level. This adjustment could suggest a change in behavior when this 
variable is analyzed in a lagged approach.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study approaches the main impacts on bank default through a new 
database, which considers annual financial reports provided by the banks. This fact 
can bring some limitations on the analysis due to misreporting or creative accounting. 
The geographical perimeter of this study was the Euro area of which there is less 
research, since did not exist many relevant bank distress situations until the recent 
crisis. 
The performed estimations give good insight on the behavior of both financial 
and macroeconomic variables regarding distress situations of financial institutions. 
Specially, measures for capitalization, asset quality, market discipline, GDP growth 
rates and inflation rates should be taken into account when assessing banking risk. On 




the other hand variables measuring efficiency, earnings, liquidity and other tested 
macroeconomic indicators (such as government bonds interest rates and balance of 
payments) did not appear to be relevant on the evaluation of bank distress situations. 
Another indicator that could improve risk assessment is the measure for growth 
(liabilities growth rate), however this variable should be tested using different 
approach, such as a lagged variable (and possibly by more than one period). This 
variable could provide an insight on unsustainable growth, which could reflect its 
impact with certain delay.  
The recent financial crisis has raised important issues in terms of banking 
supervision. Significant steps have been taken regarding the required levels of capital 
(which is in line with the estimation done in this study), however other measures 
could be done, such as the adoption of countercyclical approaches (for example 
countercyclical buffer on capital requirements) providing a combined evaluation of 
both financial and macroeconomic (business cycles) environment. Asset quality 
evaluation and market discipline shall not be forgotten; restrictive measures on 
deposits (limits to its interest rates, in order to keep discipline on the market) have 
been carried out in some countries, similar measures on loans could be subject of 
further analysis. Inflation rates should also be considered in prudential analysis, not 
only when it increases to high levels but also when it declines to particularly low 
levels due to its negative impact on economic development and on financial system.  
This study suggests future research that can bring value to banking supervision 
and to society in general, namely in the development of the banking union that is 
taking place within the Monetary Union. 
Given this framework, one can conclude that both bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables affect bank performance and therefore the solvency levels 




of a financial institution. Thus, supervisory authorities should take in consideration 
not only the financial specific performance but also the macroeconomic environment 
where the financial institution is based on (specially the business cycles and 
macroeconomic prices).   
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Appendix data description 
 
Table III 







Banco de Sabadell, SA Spain
Banco Popular Espanhol, SA Spain
Banco Santander, SA Spain
BCP Portugal






Banca Monte Paschi Siena Italy













Allied Irish Bank Ireland
Anglo Irish Bank Ireland









Bank-specific variables by category 
 
Variables Category 
    
Total Equity / Total Assets Capital 
Loan impairments/ Net loans Asset quality 
Cost-to-Income ratio Management 
Return On Equity Earnings 
Return On Assets Earnings 
Liquid Assets / Short-term funding Liquidity 
Liquid Assets / Total Assets Liquidity 
Loan to Deposits ratio Liquidity 






Figure 1 - Number of Defaults, by Country 










Figure 3 - Number of Defaults, by Year (% of total defaults) 
  





Default situations by bank and period 
 
Financial 
Institutions Country Default Notes 
  
   
BBVA Spain - - 
Banco de 
Sabadell, SA Spain - - 
Banco Popular 
Espanhol, SA Spain - - 
Banco 
Santander, SA Spain - - 
BCP Portugal 2012 State aid through Contingent Convertibles (€3Bn) 
Banco Espirito 
Santo Portugal - - 
BPI Portugal 2012 State aid through Contingent Convertibles 
Banif Portugal 2012 State aid through capital injection and Contingent Convertibles (€1.1Bn) 
BNP Paribas France 2009 State aid to avoid credit crunch in french economy €5.1Bn Subordinated government bonds 
Credit Agricole France 2008 State aid to avoid credit crunch in french economy €3Bn Subordinated government bonds 
Societé Générale France 2009 State aid to avoid credit crunch in french economy 
Banca Monte 
Paschi Siena Italy 2009 and 2012 
State aid through Tremonti bonds €1.9Bn in 2009,  
€3.9Bn hybrid instruments ("Monti Bonds") 2012 
Banca Popolare 
de Milano Italy 2009 State aid through "Tremonti Bonds" (€500M) 
Banca Popolare Italy 2009 State aid through "Tremonti Bonds" (€1.45Bn) 
UBI Banca Italy - - 
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy - - 
Commerzbank Germany 2008 and 2009 State aid through Special Fund for Financial Market Stabilization (SoFFin)  
Deutsche Bank Germany - - 
Alpha Bank Greece 2009 and 2012 State aid capital injection through preference share €940M (2009) and €2.9Bn convertible bonds (2012) 
Eurobank 
Properties Greece 2009 and 2012 
State aid through preference share €950M (2009) and 
€3.1Bn Bonds (2012) 
Piraeus Bank Greece 2009 and 2012 
State aid through preference share €370M (2009) and 
€7.3Bn through Share capital increase Contigent 
convertible securities (2012) 
National Bank Greece 2009 and 2012 State aid through preference share (2009) and Bonds (2012) 
KBC Group Belgium 2008 and 2009 
State aid €7Bn in perpetual , non-transferable, non-
voting core-capital securities €3.5Bn each year (2008 and 
2009) 




Dexia Belgium 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 
State aid through capital injection €6Bn (2008) and State 
guarantee (51% of the €45.7Bn was funds covered by the 
State guarantee in 2009; continue to use State guarantee 
untill July 2010; More State liquidity guarantee)  to fund 
its activities (liquidity crisis) untill 2012 and a €5.5Bn 
capital increase in 2012 
ING Group Netherlands 2008 and 2009 
State aid, and Dutch State took over the risk of 80% of a 
large package of US Alt-A mortgage loans  
Allied Irish Bank Ireland 2009, 2010, 2011 
State aid (2009 - €3.5Bn preference shares and The 
transfer of loans from AIB to NAMA (National Assets 
Management Agency); 2010 Irish State took the majority 
of stake in AIB; 2011 - Capital contributions totalling 
€6.1Bn from Ministry of Finance and National Pension 
Reserve Fund Commission 
Anglo Irish Bank Ireland 2009 and 2010 
State aid (2009 - €4Bn capital increase Ministry of 
Finance, Transfer of loans to "NAMA" in oreder to 
reduce RWAs; 2010 - total of €17Bn capital support 
provided by Minister for Finance and the bank has 
transferred €33Bn of assets to NAMA) 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 2009, 2010, 2011 
State aid (2009 - capital increase of €3.5Bn in preference 
stock; 2010 - sale of €9.4Bn of eligible assets to NAMA, 
plus €1.1Bn capital increase with Government sources; 
2011 - €1Bn Contigent capital, the bank generated 
€1.9Bn of ordinary stock subscribed by the National 
Pension Rserve Fund Commission) 
Erste Bank Austria 2009 State aid (€1.2Bn in participation capital issuance) 
Raiffeisen Bank Austria 2009 State aid (€1.75Bn of participation capital) 
Nordea AB Finland - - 
 
 
Explanatory variables average evolution 
 
 
Figure 4 - Total Equity to Total Assets sample 
average evolution 
 
Figure 5 - Average of Loan Impairments to 
Total Net Loans (evolution)





Figure 6 - Average Cost-to-Income Ratio 
(evolution) 
 
Figure 7 - Average Return on Equity 
(evolution) 
 
Figure 8 - Average Return on Assets 
(evolution) 
 
Figure 9 - Average of Liquid Assets to Total 
Assets (evolution) 
 
Figure 10 - Average of Liquid Assets to Short-
term Funding (evolution)  
 
 




Figure 12 - Average Net Interest Income to 
Net Loans (evolution) 
 
Figure 13 - Average Liabilities Growth Rates 
(evolution) 
 





Figure 14 - Average GDP growth rate 
(evolution) 
 
Figure 15  - Average Inflation rate (evolution) 
 Figure 16 – Average Government 10 year 
bonds’ interest rates (evolution) 
 




























































Estimation regression model with Bank-specific and macroeconomic statistically 
significant variables 
 
 
 
